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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
This Court has jurisdiction over "appeals from a court of record in criminal cases"
U T A H CODE ANNOTATED

§ 78-2a-3(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the convictions for communications
fraud and unlawful activity?

Standard of Appellate Review: Following a bench trial below, this Court will
apply a "clearly erroneous" standard, reviewing the marshaled evidence on appeal to
determine if the verdicts were "against the clear weight of the evidence," or if the Court
"otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." (Spanish
Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 502 (Utah App. 1999)).

2.

Did it run contrary to public policy to conclude that Richard Nichols
committed communications fraud and unlawful activity when he continued to
sell cars knowing that Remember When was experiencing financial hardship?

Standard of Appellate Review: Because this is a question of law, the Court will apply a
correctness standard. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998).
3.
Did the trial judge commit prejudicial error by assuming the role of a
prosecutor when he examined a witness, all the while ignoring defense
counsel's evidentiary objections?
1

Standard of Appellate Review: The propriety of a trial court's examination of
witnesses is reviewed on an abuse-of-discretion standard. See State v. Gleason, 40 P.2d
222, 228 (Utah 1935).
STATUTES, RULES AND CASES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
76-10-1801. Communications fraud — Elements — Penalties.
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another or to obtain from
another money, property, or anything of value by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly
with any person by any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice
is guilty of...
(d) a second degree felony when the value of the property, money, or thing obtained or sought
to be obtained is or exceeds $5,000; and
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or artifice to defraud is other than
the obtaining of something of monetary value.
(2) The determination of the degree of any offense under Subsection (1) shall be measured by
the total value of all property, money, or things obtained or sought to be obtained by the scheme
or artifice described in Subsection (1) except as provided in Subsection (l)(e).
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the offense described in
Subsection (1).
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in Subsection (1) to
pemianently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of value is not a necessaiy element
of the offense.
(5) Each separate communication made for the purpose of executing or concealing a scheme
or artifice described in Subsection (1) is a separate act and offense of communication fraud.
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to bestow, convey, make
known, recount, impart; to give by way of information; to talk over; or to transmit information.
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to use of the mail, telephone,
telegraph, radio, television, newspaper, computer, and spoken and written communication.
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, representations,
promises, or material omissions made or omitted were made or omitted intentionally, knowingly,
or with a reckless disregard for the truth.
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission of offense or for conduct of
another. Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
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76-10-1603. Unlawful acts. (1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds
derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person
has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or
the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use of those
proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or
participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 30, 2001, the State filed an information charging Richard Nichols, an
employee of Remember When, a car dealership, together with John Douglas and Michael
Gent, the dealership's owner and manager, with (a) eighteen counts of Communications
Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH

CODE A N N .

§§76-10-1801 and 76-2-

202, and (b) one count of Unlawful Activity, also a second degree felony, in violation of
UTAH CODE ANN.

§§ 76-10-1603(3) and 76-2-202. (CT 1). After a preliminary hearing,

Mr. Nichols was bound over on 14 counts of communication fraud and the unlawful
activity count. (Douglas and Gent later entered plea agreements). (CT 27).
On May 1-3, 2002, a three-day bench trial culminated in Mr. Nichols' conviction
for five counts of communications fraud and one count of unlawful activity. (R. 1, 250,
446,471-486).
Mr. Nichols filed a timely Motion to Arrest Judgment which was denied. (CT
154).
3

On July 23, 2002, the court sentenced Mr. Nichols to five $10,000 fines ($50,000),
suspending $47,000 of that amount; 365 days in jail with 360 days suspended five jail
terms of one to fifteen years, all suspended; and restitution in a total amount of $42,400
jointly and severally with co-defendants Douglas and Gent. (CT 174).
On August 22, 2002, Mr. Nichols filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (CT 184).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Nichols sold cars for a dealership called Remember When (R.471).
Remember When took consignments of cars from customers and sold them to the public
(R. 472-489). According to the findings of the trial court, Richard Nichols made false
statements or withheld material information in selling cars to customers named Sanchez,
and Ludwig, and in selling the cars of consignors named Dinter, Neeway and Nipper(R.
471-482). He also failed to disclose to these customers that the dealership was having
financial difficulties and a couple of customers had complained about not getting paid or
not getting their title (R. 472-478). The financial manager of the business, Michael Gent,
was buying the business from its owner, John Douglas, and had stolen between $27,000 $36,000 of customer payments to the business and converted the funds to his own use (R.
313). As a result, Sanchez did not get title to the car he purchased, Dinter did not get the
funds paid for the car Sanchez purchased, Neeway did not get funds for the car he
consigned, Nipper did not get funds for the car he consigned and Ludwig did not get title
to the car consigned by Nipper until later. (See generally, R. 471-486).
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As fully explained in sections I.A. through I.D. below, marshaling the evidence
shows a failure of sufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings of guilt on five
counts of communications fraud. Further, on the unlawful activity count, the record
shows no involvement by Mr. Nichols in any "scheme or artifice" by the Remember
When dealership to defraud the people involved in this case of their titles, money, or
vehicles by means of false representations or material omissions by way of direct or
indirect communications. (U.C.A. § 76-10-1801.) The record simply fails to support the
court's findings that Nichols knew about Remember When's fraudulent purposes and
advanced those purposes through knowing misrepresentations and omissions
communicated to or withheld from the various people.
Extending this argument, it contravenes public policy, reason, and common sense
to hold an employee criminally liable for conduct that is not criminal: that is, continuing
to do business under a general understanding that the business is experiencing financial
struggle without informing potential customers of this struggle. To apply a criminal
sanction to such a common, expected business practice sweeps too broadly, where as
here, an employee has knowledge only of general business troubles, but not of an intent to
permanently defraud and deprive people of their property.
Finally, the trial judge assumed the role of prosecutor when he conducted an
examination of witness John Douglas. He abandoned his own role as impartial
5

adjudicator, ignored defense counsel's evidentiary objections and evoked evidence on a
subject he had ruled to be irrelevant the day before.
ARGUMENT
I. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULINGS ON THE CONVICTIONS.
Where an appellant challenges the factual findings of a trial court sitting without a
jury, the appellate court applies the "clearly erroneous" standard, reviewing the evidence
on appeal to detemiine if the verdicts were u> against the clear weight of the evidence,'" or
to determine if the Court "otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.'" State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App. 106, f 10, 999 P.2d 1252, 1255,
(quoting Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 502 (Utah App. 1999) (citations
omitted)). When reviewing a sufficiency claim, the court must "' detemiine if each
element of the charged offenses is supported by the required quantum of evidence.'" Id.
For a bench trial, the question of sufficiency of the evidence may be raised on
appeal "whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an
objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for
judgment, or a motion for a new trial." State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah App.
2000) (finding UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(b) applicable to criminal proceedings "where no other
statute or rule applies," as provided by UTAH R. CIV. P. 81(e)). When, as here, a trial
court makes findings and conclusions regarding each element of the charged crimes in
6

finding the defendant guilty, the defendant's claims are preserved. Larsen, 199 P.2d at
1255.
It is the appellant's burden to marshal all of the evidence in support of the finding
and then explain why the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, was insufficient.
State v. Moosman, 19A P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). Fulfilling this burden in the
sections that follow, Nichols maintains that the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions of four counts of communications fraud and one count of unlawful activity.
A.

The evidence was insufficient to support the court's ruling that Nichols
was guilty of communications fraud with regard to Counts 6 & 7
(Dinter and Sanchez, respectively).

With regard to Counts 6 and 7 involving Warren Dinter and Albert Sanchez, the
trial court found the elements of communications fraud satisfied.
The court found that Nichols had made false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, promises, or material omissions, in that he reduced the asking price of
Dinter's consigned Corvette without the consent of Mr. Dinter and told Mr. Sanchez that
he would sell him the car if Mr. Sanchez brought in $12,000 cash by the end of the week.
(R. 478-79). The court further found that these misrepresentations "were communicated
directly or indirectly with both Mr. Dinter and Mr. Sanchez for the purpose of executing
or concealing the scheme." (R. 479).
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The court also found that "it is clear" that "there was a scheme or artifice devised
to defraud another or to obtain money, property, or anything of value" since numerous
people consigned vehicles that were then sold (some at less than the consignment price)
without the sales proceeds going to the consignors, even through the funds were not going
to Nichols. (R. 478). Elaborating on this point, the court observed that "it would be clear
to anyone working as Mr. Nichols did on a regular basis at that business and those
problems existed," (thus, Nichols was part of the scheme or artifice). (R. 478). (Here, the
court would seem to be making a general finding, applicable to all counts of
communications fraud. As discussed below in point II, this finding is itself unsupported,
where it assumes that Nichols would have to know that this scheme or artifice was in play
simply by working at Remember When during that time period when the business was in
trouble.)
In support of these findings, the court found that Sanchez testified that he had
spoken with Nichols on two occasions on the telephone and Nichols agreed to reduce the
Corvette price from the asking price, $14,500 or thereabouts, to $12,000 without the
owner's consent. (R. 474, 479). The court also found Nichols implicated as a result of
Gent's testimony that Nichols had already prepared the paperwork for the sale at the time
Sanchez arrived in town to pick up the vehicle. According to the court's findings,
however, there was an issue as to whether or not an out-of-state resident needed to pay
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sales tax, so Gent rewrote the paperwork to exclude sales tax. (R. 474). Further, the
court found Nichols' denials and his in-court statements lacking in credibility, given the
fact that those statements conflicted with those of Sanchez and were belied by his
conduct. (R. 474-77) As between Nichols' and Sanchez's testimony, the court believed
Sanchez, who it noted had little or no reason to lie. (R. 474).
Nichols challenges the above findings, contending that after marshaling the
evidence, it is insufficient to prove that he was the person who sold Mr. Dinter's car,
promised Mr. Sanchez that he could have the car for less than the asking price if he paid
cash, and failed to provide Mr. Dinter with the proceeds of the sale.
Regarding Dinter, on this question of identity, Dinter's testimony in support of the
court's findings was that Dinter had a conversation with Douglas and Nichols (but
"mostly with Richard Nichols") involving Dinter's placement of his vehicle for sale in an
auction (R. 41). Following that auction, Nichols approached Dinter to suggest that he
leave the car on the lot to see if Remember When could get a higher price. (R. 42).
Dinter testified that later, in April of 1999, Nichols called him to say that Remember
When had a potential buyer (R. 43), but that in May of 1999, Nichols called again to say
that the car had not yet sold (R. 44). Further, he testified that on June 8, 9, and 10 of
1999, he called the store and Nichols told him that the car had sold and that they needed
the title. (R. 45). Finally, he testified that shortly thereafter, Douglas's attorney called to
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ask him to take his car, and that when he went down to Remember When on June 17n, the
car was no longer on the lot, and Dinter received no payment for his car. (R. 46).
On the other hand, Dinter also testified that when he spoke with Nichols in early
June, questioning him on the particulars of the sale (including sale price), Nichols told
him "he wasn't involved in the sale, that somebody else had physically sold the car and it
was not him and that he didn't know the price." (R. 45). Dinter also equivocated on the
question of whether Gent claimed to the person who sold the car. (R. 50). Finally, Dinter
admitted that he did not know that it was Nichols who sold the car. (R. 51).
On the other side of this transaction, Mr. Sanchez testified that when he first called
Remember When in early April of 1999 to inquire about the car, the person he spoke with
identified himself as Richard Nichols. (R. 53). When he called a second time in late
April of 1999, he says he asked for the sales manager and again spoke with Richard
Nichols (R. 55). However, when Sanchez came to town and asked for Richard Nichols in
person, he found that Nichols was out of town, and that Gent consummated the sale
instead, telling him "Mr. Nichols left town for the weekend on business, so I've got all
your paperwork ready." (R. 56). Later, when Sanchez called the business repeatedly in
an attempt to get his title, he found that Nichols was never in to answer his questions, and
that he found himself always speaking with Gent (R. 60).
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Nichols testified that he never spoke with Sanchez until the time following
Sanchez's visit to Remember When, the subject of that conversation being a hat that
Sanchez had left there. (R. 356). Gent, on the other hand, admitted that he did have one
telephone conversation with Sanchez during that time (R. 280), and Sanchez testified that
the two times he spoke with a person on the telephone, the person had the same voice.
(R. 67-68). Furthemiore, Sanchez had, in his original complaint to the DMV, made prior
inconsistent statements that he had spoken with "Nichols or Gent" or the "manager" (as
opposed to "sales manager" which was Nichols) (R. 63-64; 67; 471). Similarly, Sanchez
was never able to identify Nichols' voice notwithstanding Nichols has a very distinctive,
deep voice (R. 66-67, 90; CT 91).
On the matter of the paperwork prepared for the Sanchez sale, Gent testified that
Nichols had prepared the paperwork prior to leaving town (R. 281), and that he (Gent)
corrected the sales tax portions for Sanchez, an out of state buyer, at Sanchez's request.
(R. 282). However, Sanchez never testified that Nichols did the original paperwork.
Indeed, he said that when he arrived at Remember When, Gent told him, "I've got your
paperwork ready." (R. 56). Further, it was only Gent, not Sanchez, who mentioned
anything about paperwork needing to be redone for tax purposes. (R. 56, R. 282).
Indeed, it is only Gent who testifies to this critical fact that it was Nichols, not Gent, who
originally drew up the document reflecting the fraudulent terms of the sale. (R. 281). In
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its findings, the court noted that given Gent's own culpability in the scheme or artifice, he
would look upon Gent's testimony skeptically, unless there was corroborating testimony
to lend Gent's word credibility. (R. 489). However, here, the court inexplicably
preferred Gent's testimony on the rewriting of the documents to Nichols testimony that
no other documents ever existed (R. 487-488) and to Sanchez's testimony that Gent told
him, "I've got your paperwork ready," without mention of changing the documents for
tax or any other purposes. (R. 56)
Where Gent spoke with Sanchez at least once (but probably both times) prior to
Sanchez's visit to Remember When, where Sanchez was only able to testify that the
person on the phone identified himself as Richard Nichols (and was unable to identify
Nichols' distinctive voice), where Sanchez's earlier complaint indicated a lack of
certainty on who he talked to, where Dinter himself was unable to testify with certainty
that it was Nichols who sold his car, and where Nichols denied having spoken or dealt
with Sanchez before Sanchez's visit to Remember When, the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court's finding that it was Richard Nichols who worked the deal with
Sanchez. The trial court's findings were against the clear weight of the evidence, and
there is sufficient basis for this Court to reach a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made.

12

B.

The evidence was insufficient to support the court's ruling that
Nichols was guilty of communications fraud with regard to Count
10 (Neeway).

With regard to Count 10 involving John Neeway ("Neeway"), the trial court found
the elements of communications fraud satisfied. The court had already found (for
purposes of all counts) that Nichols was a participant in a scheme or artifice when he
made that finding in disposition of the Dinter/Sanchez counts (R. 478). "It would be clear
to anyone working as Mr. Nichols did on a regular basis at that business..." that the
business was in trouble (R. 489). Regarding the "specific material misrepresentations or
omissions," the court concluded that Nichols "misrepresented either the date of sale and
certainly was guilty of an omission when he failed to notify Mr. Neeway that his vehicle
had sold on May 7th of 1999 when he first learns of the actual sale on June 13, 1999 when
the business was shut down." (R. 480). Specifically, the court found that Nichols said he
contacted Neeway on May 8, 1999 with news of a prospective purchaser (R. 479), but
that the contact actually occurred on the May 12 or 13, given the date on the fax that
Neeway's wife sent the same day of the telephone contact. (R. 479).
Supporting the court's findings is Neeway's testimony that on May 17th (a date the
court rejected as incredible, given date on the fax transmission, R. 479-80), Nichols
called to request the title, but did not mention that a sale had actually occurred at that
point. (R. 91). Neeway further testified that two weeks after this exchange, on June 13th,
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he drove up to Remember When to check on the progress of the sale and found that his
car was no longer on the lot or showroom (R 92). Neeway testified that Nichols never
gave him a date of when the car had sold. (R. 94).
However, also in evidence was Neeway's testimony that in the telephone call at
issue (taking place on either May 8th or May 12th), Nichols told him that "there was a
sale," and that was the reason why Nichols needed the title. (R. 90-91). Nichols testified
that he spoke with Neeway on May 8th, the date the car sold, and requested the title. (R.
363). Consistent with this date is Neeway's previously written letter to Assistant
Attorney General Baer explaining, "On or about May 8th, 1998 [sic], Richard Nichols
called and told me that he was working on a deal with a Mustang." (R. 100). Nichols
further testified that it took Neeway four days to fax the title as requested (R. 364), a fact
consistent with the May 12th date on the fax transmission in evidence. Further supporting
this latter point is the fact that May 7 and 8 were a Friday and Saturday, and Mr. Neeway
testified that he sent the fax from his wife's work, which he typically would not have
done over the weekend (See R. 98).
Viewing the facts in evidence together, it was against the clear weight of the
evidence for the trial court to find that Nichols' communications with Neeway involved
any covemp or fraud. Nichols called Neeway on May 8, directly following the date of the
sale, telling Neeway that "there was a sale" and requesting a faxed copy of the title. Both
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Nichols and Neeway ultimately acknowledge that it was on May 8 that this call took
place (R. 100; see R. 480). On May 8, Neeway was on notice that there was a sale in
progress, pending provision of the title, contrary to the trial court's finding.

C. The evidence was insufficient to support the court's ruling that
Nichols was guilty of communications fraud with regard to Counts
12 & 13 (Nipper and Ludwig, respectively).
On Count 12, pertaining to Mr. Paul Nipper ("Nipper"), the trial court found,
without discussion, that Nichols misrepresented the date of the sale of Nipper's vehicle,
and that Nichols made omissions by failing to inform Nipper of the sale. (R. 482).
Supporting these findings is Nipper's testimony that he and his father (David
Nipper) consigned his father's car with Remember When on October 14th, 1998, dealing
with Richard Nichols. (R. 122-25). Nipper further testified that following the
consignment, he would call or stop in to Remember When every other week or eveiy
week, always speaking with Nichols. (R. 126-27). Nipper testified that it was he, not
Nichols, who initiated the phone calls. (R. 128). According to Nipper, these regular
phone calls continued until February 17, 1999, when Nipper dropped into Remember
When and found that the car was not there. (R. 129). He testified that on that day, he
approached Nichols, who told him that the car had been sold "this past week" (R. 129),
that Nichols told him he (Nichols) had nothing to do with the payment aiTangements (R.
129), and that Nipper was never in fact paid by Remember When (R. 130). And he
15

testified that although Nichols told him the cai had sold on February 13th, Gent told him
the sale had happened on January 26th, which was the first he had heard of that
information. (R 130) He also testified that this date was corroborated by a date he saw
on a grease board behind Mr Gent. (R. 133-34).
However, on cioss-exammation, Nipper admitted that he made no phone calls
between the January 26th date he mentioned and the February 17th date he mentioned. (R.
132). Nipper further admitted that he considered Gent to be "an outright liar." (R. 135).
And he admitted that Nichols told him he was shocked that Nipper hadn't been paid (R.
137), Nichols then making a demand for payment to Gent m Nipper's presence. (R. 138).
Nichols testified on the same transactions that Nippei had come into Remembei When on
March 22nd, not February 17lh, and that Nichols told Nipper the car had sold "a couple of
months ago." (R 379)
On the motion to arrest judgment, counsel also introduced without objection an
affidavit filed by Nipper a civil case m the district court in Sandy, wherein Nipper made
statements wholly inconsistent with his trial testimony (CT 88, 95) This affidavit had
never been served on counsel and was m fact m loose papers at the Sandy District Court's
Office rather than m Nipper's case file there. It was perhaps a trial exhibit m the civil
case. Counsel did not lepresent Nichols m the civil case to which the affidavit refers.
(Id.) In this affidavit, Nippei testifies, contrary to the February 17th date cited at trial, that

16

it was early March 1999 when he checked the Remember When showroom and
discovered the 1957 Chevy was missing (Affidavit at ^ 5; CT 152). This is consistent
with Nichols' testimony that Nipper came to the dealership on March 22, 1999 (R. 379).
Thus, Nipper was not accurate when he testified that it was on February 17th rather than
March 22, 1999 when he went to Remember When (R. 128, 482). Even more
importantly, the affidavit works against Nipper's testimony that Nichols told him the car
had sold "this past week" (R. 129, 482). In his affidavit, Nipper stated that in early
March when he went into the showroom and found the car was missing, "none of the
people at the shop could tell me where the car was or whether it had been sold. Over a
series of days and visits to Remember When, I finally learned that the vehicle had been
sold on or about January 26, 1999." (Affidavit at \ 5; CT 152). This statement fully
corroborates Nichols' statement that he did not tell Nipper that the car had been sold the
week before. (R. 383).
With regard to Mr. Ludwig, the guilty finding was based on statements of Mr.
Nichols that Remember When owned the vehicle and there were title problems in Florida.
The finding was that Mr. Nichols made the statement that the dealership owned the
vehicle to both Mr. and Mrs. Ludwig (R. 483). Mr. Ludwig testified that Mr. Nichols
said they were "having problems with the deal in Florida." (R. 160). He did not say
anything about the title being in Florida although, in fact, that was where the title was
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because that was wheie Mr Nippei 's dad was and that is why Mr Nipper was
representing his dad here according to Gent. (R. 302-303) John Douglas also told Mr.
Ludwig the car had been m Florida (R 163)

Gent told the Ludwigs the title was m

Florida so he would have told Nichols the same thing (R. 174).
Mr. Nichols statement to Mi. Ludwig that "they" own the car aie not enough to
support the conclusion that Mi Nichols was representing that the dealership owned the
cai (R. 152-153)

Had Mr. Nichols intended to state the dealership owned the car he

would have stated "we" not "they" own the car. When questioned, Mr Ludwig affimied
that the word "they" was the word that was used rather than some another pronoun such
a s " w e " ( R 163)
With regaid to Mrs Ludwig, she states that Mi Nichols5 exact words to her on
another occasion outside the piesence of her husband weie "it is our car." (R. 174, 176).
This is not a misrepresentation because there is nothing inconsistent between that
statement which did not state who held the title, and the fact that the Remember When
dealership had the cai to sell on consignment Of course, the statement was never
material enough anyway for Mrs Ludwig to mention it m her conversations with
investigators immediately aftei the sale took place. (R 177-178).
D. The evidence was insufficient to support the court's ruling that
Nichols was guilty of unlawful activity.
The trial court's ruling on Count 19, the unlawful activity count, was as follows
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That leaves us with the last count which is Count 19 and we're proceeding under
subsection C as it relates to that count. The State has to prove that the defendant
conducted or participated, whether directly or indirectly on the conduct of the
enterprise affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. I do find that, in the
conduct of Remember When's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
There is no question from the multitude of testimony that was heard by this Court
that there were misrepresentations and omissions as it relates to vehicles that were
consigned and vehicles that were purchased at that particular enterprise. There's
no question in this Court's mind, certainly not a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was involved in that to the extent that he knew of the problems that were
existing. He did nothing to stop those but in fact participated in those to the
detriment of many purchasers and consigners of vehicles. Accordingly I find him
guilty on Count 19 as well.
(R. 486). The finding on various statements is referred to above, but this ruling on
"knowledge" appears to be at least tacitly linked to the court's earlier finding that "it
would be clear to anyone working as Mr. Nichols did on a regular basis at that business
and those problems existed," (R. 478) (although this appears to be speculation rather than
inference), and further that
In January, 1999 Remember When was experiencing financial problems in
the business. The testimony, at the end of 1998 the business was breaking even at
best. In January 1999 and throughout 1999, until the business was closed there
were ongoing conversations. These conversations including issues about trouble
paying owners of vehicles who had consigned their vehicles to Remember When
and also getting titles to purchasers.
(R. 472).
The "conversations" to which the trial court refers are the product of convicted
felons Gent's and Douglas's testimony, witnesses the court found incredible (R. 473, 489490). Gent testified to several occasions on which he answered Nichols' concerns about
19

problems getting titles and payments to the appropriate individuals. (R. 310). However,
Gent's specific recollections about these conversations follow on the heels of his
equivocating statement, "I believe I did speak with Mr. Nichols a few times," and his
admission in response to the court's question regarding specific dates, "I don't [recall
specific dates]. It was just a general opinion that we were sinking. The money was going
everywhere and not to the owners." (R. 310). (The money was actually going into
Gent's pocket (R.313).) Gent further testified that Nichols was active in January, 1999
discussions, during which Douglas, Gent, Nichols, and a typist were present, concerning
payment problems. (R. 313). Douglas also testified to January meetings, during which
the three men discussed the title and payment problems (R. 458, 460-462). Nichols
himself denied that any such meetings took place, or that any list of problem cars existed.
(R. 346-47).
Furthermore, Gent admitted that he had not informed Nichols that the reason
behind the nonpayment was his (Gent's) stealing $27,000 out of the account. (R. 313).
Likewise, Douglas admitted that he gave Nichols assurances that he (Douglas) would do
his part to make sure people got paid. (R. 463). Assuming these January meetings
actually took place, without the knowledge that the money was no longer available to pay
consignors (due to Gent's misappropriations) and based on his understanding that
Douglas was attempting to make good on the consignment sales, Nichols could only have
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known that consignors had not been paid yet, not that the business intended to defraud
them. Therefore, the clear weight of the evidence undermines the court's ruling that
Nichols had the requisite criminal knowledge of the business's intent to withhold
payment and titles from consignors and buyers.
II.

IT IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY TO CONCLUDE THAT A PERSON HAS
COMMITTED COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD AND UNLAWFUL
ACTIVITY BY VIRTUE OF CONTINUING TO DO BUSINESS UNDER A
GENERAL UNDERSTANDING THAT THE BUSINESS IS EXPERIENCING
FINANCIAL HARDSHIP.
Based on the immediately foregoing argument regarding what Nichols "knew"

about the relevant business affairs of Remember When, it is against public policy to find
him guilty of communications fraud and unlawful activity for continuing to act as
salesperson for the company. Nichols did not handle titles (R. 452-455, 458, 466-468).
He did not handle payment of consignors (R. 452-455,458, 466-468). Nichols did not
know at the time he was selling cars that Gent was draining money from the business as
Gent was stealing the funds (R. 313, 467-468). Likewise, when the problems with
nonpayment came to his attention, and he made inquiries of John Douglas, Douglas
assured him that he would do his best to get people paid (R. 463).
The court's use of the finding that Nichols knew generally of "the problems that
were existing," to support conclusion of criminal "knowledge" is troubling in its breadth.
Although the argument here does not rise to the level of a constitutional overbreadth or
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vagueness challenge to the applicable statutes themselves, it is clear that the legislature
did not intend to impose fraud and unlawful activity sanctions on employees continuing
to work for business experiencing financial trouble. As a salesperson, Nichols' role was
to sell cars. If the business was struggling, the obvious remedy was to continue to sell
more cars, not to share with potential customers the financial hardships of the business
and ensure the death of the dealership. To impose such a duty goes against reason and
common sense, for virtually all business would fail if customers knew of the struggles
behind the scenes.
A related point bears mentioning. In direct contrast with Gent and Douglas,
Nichols did not benefit from Gent's stolen proceeds from the sales at issue, aside from the
normal commission he would expect from any sale (R. 467). Were Nichols "in on" the
"scheme or artifice" at issue here, he would have received more than his normal
commissions. In short, Nichols' supposed "knowledge" of the "problems" experienced
by the business was far too general to rise to the level of criminality. Only if Nichols
knew of Gent's treachery and Douglas's intentions not to pay consignors and provide
titles to buyers—in other words, only if he knew that people were being permanently
deprived of their money, their cars, or their titles—would his business practices (and the
relevant communications) be criminal in nature. As the argument in Section I, Part D
above demonstrates, the evidence simply does not support such a conclusion.
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III.

THE TRIAL JUDGE ABANDONED HIS ROLE AS AN IMPARTIAL
ADJUDICATOR AND TOOK ON THE ROLE OF PROSECUTOR WHEN
HE EXAMINED ONE OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES, DURING WHICH
EXAMINATION HE FAILED TO RULE ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S
EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS.
According to the "plain error" doctrine, the Court must find "that it should have

been obvious to the trial court that it was committing error.'" (quoting State v. Whittle,
780 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah 1989)). It must be obvious to the trial court that it is committing
error. (Id.) Here, such a conclusion is warranted. It is well-established that a trial judge
may question witnesses called either by one of the parties or by the court itself, for the
purposes of clarifying, explaining, or adding to evidence as it relates to disputed issues.
State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting State v. Mellen, 583 P.2d
46, 48 (Utah 1978)); See also Rule 614(b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE (providing that
"[t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party"). Still, the
Utah Supreme Court has generally discouraged the practice of witness examination by the
trial court, Gleason, 40 P.2d at 228, and has specifically warned that a trial judge is not to
"usurp counsel's function" in the process of questioning. Gleason, 40 P.2d at 227; State
v. Green, 57 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 1936).
In the instant case, the trial judge stepped out of his judicial role and assumed that
of the prosecutor to the extent that he 1) questioned the witness on matters that the judge
himself had earlier ruled to be inadmissible on grounds of irrelevance; and 2)
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ignored/failed to rule on defense counsel's objections to that effect. Further, this
evidence, critical as it was to the judge's ultimate findings on Nichols' credibility, clearly
prejudiced Nichols and deprived him of an unbiased trial.
Following both the Prosecution's and the Defense's examination of John Douglas,
the trial court asked a series of questions of the witness. (R. 463-467) Roughly midway
through the court's examination, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: What was Mr. Nichols' position after January of 1999 at
Remember When?
THE WITNESS: It is my understanding that first of all he was the sales manager
for Mr. Gent and then became a partner with Mr. Gent.
MR. McVEY: Objection, lack of foundation and hearsay.
THE COURT: How did you determine that?
THE WITNESS: I was told by several people that were involved with the business
and by the landlord that Mr. Nichols and Mr. Gent were forming some type of
partnership.
MR. MCVEY: Objection, same objection, Your Honor.
COURT: I'm talking before June 13th of 1999.
THE WITNESS: That's correct.
(R. 465-66). The court neglected to rule on either of defense counsel's objections, and
instead continues to evoke testimony on the subject of Nichols' and Gent's partnership
(Cruisin' Classics) following the closing of Remember When, a subject the court had, on
its own volition, found to be irrelevant to the case and declared would not figure into his
decision. (R. 440). However, in his ruling, the judge found:
There is also a problem of credibility as it relates to Michael Gent. Mr.
Nichols testified that he didn't like him, didn't want to socialize with him, wanted
nothing virtually to do with the man, didn't recognized [sic] him as his superior.
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But yet the testimony is, by Mr. Douglas, that when Mr. Douglas indicated to the
defendant, Mr. Nichols, that Mr. Gent would be the operator, no problem was ever
expressed. Mr. Nichols continued to send all problems with respect to titles, et
cetera to Mr. Gent and seemed to act as though he were superior in his dealings
with him. Furthermore, after the business was closed down on June 13th, he opens
up another business and Mr. Gent is either an employee or partner, depending on
who you believe, but they worked together in another business.
(R. 477). Because in truth the fact of Nichols' ongoing partnership with Gent did figure
centrally in the judge's credibility determinations, the judge's own role in evoking
testimony on that partnership, over the objections of defense counsel, worked prejudice
and harm on Nichols and constituted an abuse of discretion on the court's part.

CONCLUSION
After reviewing the relevant law and evidence, this Court should conclude that the
convictions for communications fraud and unlawful activity were "against the clear
weight of the evidence," and should reach "a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made" as a result of the trial court's erroneous legal reasoning in entering those
convictions.
Based on the analysis provided in this brief, the Court should reverse the
convictions for communications fraud and unlawful activity, and order those charges
dismissed for insufficient evidence.
Respectfully submitted.
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DATED this $0

day of December, 2002
KIRTON & McCONKIE

>amuel D. McVey
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ADDENDUM
ORAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT

(Closing arguments were not transcribed per request
of Mr. McVey)
RULING
THE COURT: All right.
court is back in session.

The record will reflect the

Counsel for the State and for

defendant, Mr. Nichols, are all present. All right, let me just
kind of do some general findings and then as we come to each
specific count I will make some specific findings as it relates
to the count involved.
All right.

I make the following findings, that

Remember When operated a business in Salt Lake County at all
time that's material to this case, that being 1998 through June
13th of 1999.

John Douglas was the owner of the business,

however, beginning in January of 1999 he played a limited role
in the business due to health problems.

Mike Gent who

basically was hired to do some promotions, entered into an
agreement with Mr. Douglas to purchase the business about
January, 1999. He became the operator of that business in
January, 1999.
Next, the defendant was a salesman, initially at
Remember When.

Started on February 5th of 1998 and eventually

served as a sales manager, that's based on both agreements
that he signed indicating he was sales manager as well as
representations he made to various purchasers and consigners of
vehicles at that business.
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1

In January, 1999 Remember When was experiencing

2

financial problems in the business.

The testimony, at the end

3

of 1998 the business was breaking even at best. In January of

4

1999 and throughout 1999, until the business was closed there

5

were ongoing conversations.

6

issues about trouble paying owners of vehicles who had

7

consigned their vehicles to

8

titles to purchasers.

9

1999, in fact, many owners were not getting paid who had

These conversations including

Remember When and also getting

The next finding would be that during

10

consigned vehicles at Remember When and titles were not

11

delivered to purchasers.

12

Alright, as to the specific findings as it relates to

13

Counts 2 and 3, that would be the Eskelson, Count 3, and Count

14

2 is the Central Bank counts, I'm finding that a 1955 Ford

15

truck was consigned by Central Bank to Remember When.

16

Hurren testified that he only dealt with John Douglas as it

17

relates to that consignment.

Douglas

The only connection that he had

18 I with the defendant, Mr. Nichols, was a telephone call on March
19 I 23rd of 1999 to reduce the price from $10,250 to $9,250.
20

That

Mr. Hurren testified that he couldn't even identify the

21 i defendant, Mr. Nichols. I find that the x55 Ford truck was sold
22 I on April 2nd of 1999 to Eskelson for $7,000.
23

Central Bank did

not receive the $7,000 price and Eskelson did not receive the

24 | title.
25 j

The following conclusions as it relates to that
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particular charge, those two counts, I find that the price was
in fact less than the agreed upon price.
was $9,250.
sold for.

The agreed upon price

The $7,000 was the price that the truck eventually

There is testimony that the operator at the time,

Mike Gent, called Central Bank and received authorization to
reduce the price to $7,000 and that the defendant then relayed
that to Mr. Eskelson.

The Court does have a reasonable doubt

as to whether or not the defendant was guilty of those two
counts based upon the fact that Mr. Gent has very little
credibility in this Court's eyes. He clearly is the individual
who profited from what occurred in connection with the
unlawful activity that occurred at Remember When and based upon
his credibility even as it relates to Mr. Nichols, I find the
defendant not guilty of Counts 2 and 3.
Alright, with respect to Counts 6 which is the
Dinter court and Count 7 I make the following findings; a 1975
Corvette Roadster was consigned by Warren Dinter through
Remember When. Originally was to be sold at auction if it could
net $14,500. The vehicle did not net the $14,500 so it remained
on the lot.

That vehicle was sold on April 30th of 1999 to

Albert Sanchez for $12,000. Mr. Dinter did not receive the
sale proceeds and Mr. Dinter was able, through various efforts
to eventually get his Corvette from the State of Colorado.
There is conflicting testimony as it relates to the
interaction between Mr. Sanchez and the defendant, Mr. Nichols.
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1

Mr. Nichols testified that he only had contact with Mr. Sanchez

2

on occasion, that was after the vehicle was sold when the

3

defendant called Remember When and asked if he would give a

4

message to Mr. Gent to return his hat.

5

In contrast to that, Mr. Sanchez testified that he

6

spoke with the defendant, Mr. Nichols; that Mr. Nichols

7

identified himself as the sales manager and Mr. Nichols

8

indicated to Mr. Sanchez that the owner wanted $14,000 but if

9

he could get him $12,000 by the end of the week, he could sell

10 i it for that amount and cash money would be a lot better. Mr.
11 | Sanchez then brought a $12,000 cashier's check to Remember
12

When. When he arrived the defendant was out of town. There is

13

testimony I believe both from Mr. Sanchez as well as Mr. Gent

14

that the paperwork for the $12,000 sale on the vehicle had

15

already been prepared; however, there was an issue as it

16

relates to whether or not an out of state resident needs to pay

17

sales tax and so Mr. Gent rewrote the paperwork so that there i

18

was not the sales tax.

19

And as I make a decision regarding the issue of

20 I whether or not the defendant is guilty of communications fraud,
21

it becomes a credibility issue.

And as it relates to the

22

credibility issues, I make the following findings.

23

Mr. Sanchez is the victim in this case, he has little, if any,

24 I basis to fabricate his testimony before the Court.

I do find

There is

25 | nothing that the Court observed in his demeanor or his
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testimony that was inconsistent. He appeared to be an
individual who was obviously frustrated and upset because
he paid $12,000 for a vehicle that was eventually reported as
stolen and returned.
On the other hand as I review the credibility of the
defendant, Mr. Nichols, I make the following analysis, I find
that on numerous occasions his testimony is not accurate.

He

testified as it relates to the sales manager, that he was not
the sales manager, he's only a salesperson and that only on
Exhibit 11 did he ever signed his name as sales manager. In
contrast Exhibit 18, the Sellabogen/Jason Hodges was introduced
where again the defendant signed his name as sales manager.
There's also the testimony of Mr. John Douglas that the
defendant was eventually given the position of sales manager at
Remember When.
There's also questions of credibility regarding Mr.
Nichols as it relates to his knowledge of the problems at
Remember When.

Mr. Nichols testified the only time he - the

first time he became aware of the problems at Remember When was
in March, it was March 22nd of 1999 when Mr. Nipper came into
the establishment and indicated that he hadn't been paid. He
indicated he was shocked, this is the first time be became
aware of that.

There is contrary testimony from Mr. Gent,

again whose testimony was taken with a grain of salt by the
Court.

Mr. Gent did testify that in January of 1999 they
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1

discussed the problems about not paying owners and not getting

2

titles and, in fact, I believe there was a list of some 12 or

3

so cars they were having trouble with. That was corroborated by

4

the testimony this morning of Mr. Douglas who testified that of

5

December, 1998, that the business was having financial

6

problems, it was breaking even at best and had to borrow money

7

for the business. And from January of 1999 until the business

8

closed there was ongoing discussions with both Mr. Gent and Mr.

9

Nichols as it relates to the problems of that business which

10

included both getting titles to the purchasers and paying

11

owners who placed their vehicles on consignment.

12

There is also testimony from almost every victim in

13

this case that directly contradicts Mr. Nichols.

Examples of

14

those would be the date that Mr. Nipper came in, Mr. Nipper

15

testified it was February 18th.

16

on March 22nd.

17

paid between Mr. Gent and Mr. Nichols. The testimony

18

discrepancies between Mr. Sanchez that the Court has previously

19

identified. There certainly is a credibility issue with Mr.

20

Nichols when he says he became aware of the Nipper problem and

21

decided that he was going to leave Remember When; that he

22

advised Mr. Douglas and Mr. Gent; agreed to stay on just to

Mr. Nichols testified it was

There is an issue about $7,000 cash that was

23 I train another employee. That was contradicted by Mr. Douglas
24

indicating he never said he would leave. I think a reasonable

25 I person who became aware of all the problems that existed at
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1

Remember When, if they were not part of the problem, the

2

scheme, the artifice certainly would have left and by all means

3

should have alerted authorities as to what was going on in

4

that particular business.

5

There is also a problem of credibility as it relates

6

to Michael Gent.

Mr. Nichols testified that he didn't like

7

him, didn't want to socialize with him, wanted nothing

8

virtually to do with the man, didn't recognized him as his

9

superior. But yet the testimony is, by Mr. Douglas, that when

10

Mr. Douglas indicated to the defendant, Mr. Nichols, that Mr.

11

Gent would be the operator, no problem was ever expressed.

12

Nichols continued to send all problems with respect to titles,

13

et cetera to Mr. Gent and seemed to act as though he were

14

superior in his dealings with him.

15

business was closed down on June 13th, he opens up another

16

business and Mr. Gent is either an employee or partner,

17

depending on who you believe, but they worked together in

18

another business. So as I go back to the Sanchez matter.

19

weigh the credibility of Mr. Sanchez and I weigh the

20

credibility of Mr. Nichols, there's no question that the

21

balance weighs heavily in favor of Mr. Sanchez.

22

I do find—

23 J

MR. McVEY:

24
25

Mr.

Furthermore, after the

Your Honor, before that.

As I

Could I just

ask one clarification on one of your findings.
THE COURT:

You know, I'd just as soon wait until I
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1
2
3
4
5
6

finish.
MR. McVEY:
That's fine.

That's fine.

Thank you Your Honor.

That's fine.

THE COURT:

I've got a train of thought and I'm going

to continue and then I think it will be a lot easier for me.
I am, I then have to review the elements of the crime

7

of communication fraud.

I have to find there was a scheme

8

or artifice devised to defraud another or to obtain money,

9

property or anything of value. It is clear that there was such

10

a scheme or artifice.

11

the evidence that was presented during the last three days of

12

people who brought their vehicles in on consignment. Those

13

vehicles were sold, some at less than the agreed upon price and

14

the sellers, for the most part, almost without exception, did

15

not get paid the proceeds from the sale.

16

There are numerous people, based upon

Furthermore, the owners, new owners did not get title

17 J to their property. The evidence is such that it would be clear
18

to anyone working as Mr. Nichols did on a regular basis

19

at that business and those problems existed. And the Court

20

finds that he was part of the scheme or artifice to defraud

21

those people.

22

so by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations,

The second part of the element would be he did

23 J promises or material omissions and I have to discuss those
24

as they relate to each particular count.

In this particular

25

count I do find that there were so material misrepresentations
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or omissions, specifically, the defendant reduced the price
without the consent of Mr. Dinter and told Mr. Sanchez that if
he brought the $12,000 cash by the end of the week that he
could purchase that vehicle.

Those being the

misrepresentations and omissions as it relates to those two
counts. They were communicated directly or indirectly with both
Mr. Dinter and Mr. Sanchez for the purpose of executing or
concealing the scheme and certainly the value of the property
was over $5,000. Accordingly as it relates to Count 6 and Count
7 I am finding the defendant guilty of both those counts.
As it relates to Count 8, that count was dismissed on
the State's own motion this morning. Count 9 was previously
dismissed.

Count 10 and 11 involves the counts involving Jack

or John Neeway and Dennis McLelland, involving a 1966 Mustang,
the Court finds that it was consigned on May 28th, 1988 for
$10,700.

Mr. Neeway agreed to lower the price to $8,400 in

February, 1999. That vehicle was sold on May 7th of 1999 to
Dennis McLelland for $8,400.

Mr. Neeway was contacted by the

defendant. There was a discrepancy as to the date that he was
contacted. The defendant testifies he contacted him, I believe
on May 8 of 1999 and said that he had a prospective purchaser,
and to fax him a copy of the title.

Mr. Neeway's testimony as

I recall it was that that occurred on the 12th or 13th because
he had his wife fax it the same day that the request was made.
There is some issue regarding the 17th. The Court finds that
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1

that is not a credible date. It would have had to have been on

2

the date that, an earlier date because the fax copy was on

3

either the 12th or 13th, depending upon whether you believe the

4

date on the fax or the date indicated in testimony.

5

As it relates to the specific material

6

misrepresentations or omissions, it is alleged by the State the

7

misrepresentation was that the defendant said that he was

8

working on a sale and the sale was actually consummated.

9

There's no question the sale took place

on May 7 of 1999 and

10

the omission that the State is alleging is that the victim, Mr.

11

Neeway, was not told of the actual sale.

12

the Court is that Mr. Neeway testified he first learned of the

13

sale of the vehicle on June 13th of 1999 when he drove up to

14

Remember When and for the first time the defendant told him his

15

vehicle was sold.

16 I

The evidence before

The Court does conclude based upon that, that the

17

defendant misrepresented either the date of sale and certainly

18

was guilty of an omission when he failed to notify Mr. Neeway

19

that his vehicle had sold on May 7th of 1999 when he first

20

learns of the actual sale on June 13, 1999 when the business

21

was shut down. Accordingly I find the defendant guilty on Count

22 I 10 relating to the Neeway transaction.
23

On Count 11, the Court finds insufficient evidence to

24

find the defendant guilty. There was testimony. I reviewed it

25

again at the noon break. On direct examination

Mr. McLelland
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testified that the defendant told him that the title was at the
accountant's office but on cross examination he indicated the
defendant said Mr. Gent was dealing with title issues. I
certainly find there's reasonable doubt as to whether or not
there was a misrepresentation as it relates to the title, and
accordingly find insufficient evidence and find the defendant
not guilty on Count 12 as it relates - Count 11.
As it relates to Count 12 and 13 they relate to the
Nipper/Ludwig matters.

The Court specifically finds that there

was a 1957 Chevrolet that was consigned by Mr. Nipper on
October 15th of 1998 for $22,000. That vehicle was sold on
January 16, 1999 to Mr. Ludwig for $24,950. It was sold by the
defendant.

Mr. Nipper or his father never received payment of

the $22,000. He was given a bounced check, however.

The

defendant signed the contract for sale as sales manager and it
wasn't until April 13th, 2001 that Mr. Ludwig eventually got
title.
As it relates to the misrepresentations or omissions,
the State is alleging that the defendant misrepresented to Mr.
Nipper that the vehicle was sold last weekend and also omitted
to tell Mr. Nipper about the sale in a timely manner. The
testimony as it relates to those issues are, the defendant
testified that the car sold on January 16th of 1999. Mr.
Nipper came in the establishment of Remember When on March 22nd
of 1999 and said he was not paid. He indicated that was the
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1

first time he was aware of the problem.

The defendant said

2

that he told Mr. Nipper when he came in that the vehicle sold a

3

couple months ago. Mr. Nipper testified that he called the

4

defendant on a weekly or bi-weekly basis from October 15th of

5

1998 until he determined the vehicle was sold; that it wasn't

6

on March 22nd, it was on February 17th of 1999 when he went to

7

Remember When and the defendant said that the vehicle was sold

8

last weekend. While the defendant testified that he had no

9

contact with Mr. Nipper during this period of time, Mr. Nipper

10

specifically testified he visited or called Remember When six

11

to seven times between the dates of February 18th and March

12

24th.

13

In weighing the credibility of the witnesses in this

14 I case, based upon the reasons previously set forth, I find Mr.
15

Nichols credibility is certainly suspect. I do not find any

16

reason to challenge the credibility of Mr. Nipper. There is

17

nothing inconsistent with his testimony and appeared to be

18

credible.

19

Accordingly, I am finding the defendant guilty on

20

Count 12 as it relates to the Nipper transaction and find that

21

the misrepresentations were made with regard to when the

22 J vehicle was sold and also there were omissions in terms of not
23 J telling the owner, Mr. Nipper, about the sell of the vehicle.
24
25

As it relates to Mr. Ludwig, the alleged
misrepresentations are that Remember When owned the vehicle and
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1

the defendant testified that there were problems with the title

2

in Florida.

3

statements about the defendant claiming that Remember When

4

owned the vehicle and there was certainly not a title problem

5

in Florida. I find there were misrepresentations as it relates

6

to Court 13 as well and accordingly I find the defendant guilty

7

of that count.

8

I find both Mr. and Mrs. Ludwig made the

On Count 16, the Pedockie count, the evidence and the

9

findings of the Court are that Mr. Pedockie purchased a 1965

10

Ford Crown Victoria for $16,000 cash. He did feel that there

11

were some misrepresentations as related to whether this was a

12 I matching numbers car or an original condition car.

As it

13

relates to those misrepresentations, which are the claim of the

14

State, I do find that there is insufficient evidence to justify

15

or support that.

16

about Mr. Pedockie's statement that the defendant told him that

17

it was a matching number car.

18

credible statement when he finally said that that did occur.

19

Furthermore, the Court has a reasonable doubt whether or not

20

any such conversation took place.

21

defendant not guilty as it relates to the x55 Ford Crown

22

Victoria.

23

I share Mr. McVey's credibility concerns

That did not appear to be a

Accordingly I find the

As it relates to the y51 Chev Belair, the Court finds

24

that that vehicle was placed with Remember When on consignment

25

for $13,000 net. It was used in part to finance the purchase of
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1

the *55 Crown Victoria.

That the vehicle was in fact sold on

2

March - if I can read my writing correctly - 10th of 1999 in

3

Mississippi for $13,000. The testimony is that the owner, Mr.

4

Pedockie, came in March of 1999 and was told that the vehicle

5

was in fact sold to a buyer in Mississippi and he would be paid

6

his money in a couple of days.

7

And the Court does not find the evidence sufficient to convict

8

the defendant on this Count as it relates to the ^57 Chevy

9

Belair either, as it relates to the failure to tell Mr.

He was never paid the $13,000.

10

Pedockie was sold. It was sold in March, March 10, 1999 and Mr.

11

Pedockie came into Remember When in March of 1999 and that

12

certainly is insufficient time for the omission to take place.

13

Furthermore, according to the consignment agreement

14

he was to be paid within 21 days after sale.

15

defendant to say he'd get his money in a couple of days does

16

not appear to be a misrepresentation.

17

So for the

As it relates to Count 17, the Thornton count and

18

Count 18, the Smith count, the Court makes the following

19

findings; Mr. Richard Thornton consigned a red 1966 Mustang for

20

$9,000 net in May of 1998.

21

connection with that consignment.

22

purchased that vehicle for $9,300 on May 14, 1999. The

23

defendant testified that he'd never seen Mr. Thornton in live

24

and that is consistent with Mr. Thornton's testimony that he

25

dealt with Mr. Douglas on this case and thinks he had a few

He dealt with John Douglas in
Robert Smith eventually
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1

conversations with the defendant, I'm not sure who he was and

2

he simply asked what was going on and the defendant responded

3

there's been a few prospective purchasers. Nothing as it

4

relates to that in this Court's view is sufficient for a

5

misrepresentation nor are there any omissions as it relates to

6

Mr. Nichols. Accordingly I find the defendant not guilty as it

7

relates to Count 17.

8
9

As it relates to Count 18, Mr. Smith, the State
alleges that there were misrepresentations regarding the

10

vehicle being an Hawaiian owned car and the Court finds that

11

there were Utah plates on that vehicle. Mr. Thornton, I

12

believe, testified to that effect. The vehicle was for a long

13

time on Hawaii. I find insufficient evidence as it relates to

14

that particular representation. As it relates to the title,

15

this vehicle sold on May 14th of 1999 and there certainly is an

16 I issue of whether it was defendant's responsibility to get
17

title. I therefore find the defendant not guilty on Count 18 as

18

well.

19

That leaves us with the last count which is Count 19

20

and we're proceeding under subsection C as it relates to that

21

count. The State has to prove that the defendant conducted or

22

participated, whether directly or indirectly on the conduct of

23

the enterprise affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.

24

I do find that, in fact, Mr. Nichols did participate in the

25

conduct of Remember When's affairs through a pattern of
485

unlawful activity.

There is no question from the multitude of

testimony that was heard by this Court that there were
misrepresentations and omissions as it relates to vehicles that
were consigned and vehicles that were purchased at that
particular enterprise. There's no question in this Court's
mind, certainly not a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
involved in that to the extent that he knew of the problems
that were existing. He did nothing to stop those but in fact
participated in those to the detriment of many purchasers and
consigners of vehicles. Accordingly I find him guilty on Count
19 as well.
Mr. McVey, you had a question I believe.
MR. McVEY:

Yes, Your Honor.

If I could just clarify

a couple of the findings as we go back through the notes here.
Just in the January x99 until Remember When was closed, there
were conversations regarding problems paying vehicles and
purchasers.

I believe that was a finding.

Well, I guess

that's just kind of a general finding.
THE COURT:

It is.

MR. McVEY:

Okay.

It wasn't your intent to say that

this meeting that was testified about took place of anything
like that.

They were just ongoing meetings?

THE COURT:

I'm finding that as early as January of

1999 there were ongoing meetings with the defendant, Mr. Gent
and John Douglas where those issues were discussed.
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1

MR. McVEY:

And then, on getting over to count, the

2

Sanchez count which is Count 7, did you make a finding that Mr.

3

Sanchez testified that there was a sales tax issue on his

4

documents and so the documents were redone or did Mr. Gent?

5

THE COURT:

The finding that I made as it relates to

6

that particular purchase was that there was an issue regarding

7

whether or not sales tax should be paid on the vehicle since

8

Mr. Sanchez is a resident of Colorado and the paperwork was

9

redrawn or redrafted so that the sales tax was not paid.

10

MR. McVEY:

But what I'm wondering is are you making

11

the finding that that's based on Mr. Sanchez's testimony that

12

he said there being something about a sales tax issue, so

13 I that's why the - because I remember Mr. Gent's testimony on
14

that.

15

I've got that finding clear on that point.

16

I

didn't remember Sanchez.

THE COURT:

I just wanted to make sure

Let me review my notes.

I can't

17

ascertain from my notes whether or not that was Sanchez or Gent

18

or both testimony. I recall the testimony but I can't recall

19

specifically, Mr. McVey, whether that was from Mr. Sanchez as

20

well as Mr. Gent.

21

MR. McVEY:

The reason I raise that is I believe, I

22

thought it was only Mr. Gent that brought that up is the reason

23

why these documents had to be redone and —

24
25

THE COURT:

I do recall the testimony of Mr. Sanchez

that the documents were prepared when he arrived there.
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1

MR. McVEY:

Right, and that's correct.

But I didn't

2

recall anything about him saying that the documents were redone

3

which would be consistent with —

4

THE COURT:

Yes, and again in looking at my notes I

5

can't ascertain whether or not he indicated they were

6

specifically redone because of the tax issue.

7

testimony but it may have been just from Mr. Gent.

8
9

MR. McVEY:

I do recall that

And then on the Neeway transaction.

You'd indicated that the defendant stated he contacted Mr.

10

Neeway on May - was it May 7 of 8?

The only reason I ask is my

11

notes said that Mr. Nichols said he contacted him on May 7.

12

think Mr. Neeway said it was, in that letter it was the 8th but

13

I may be - I just

14

found there.

wanted to clarify the date that you had

15

THE COURT:

And I found 7th or 8th.

16

MR. McVEY:

So 7th or 8th?

17

THE COURT: Yes. The vehicle was sold on the 8th, I

18

believe - nope, the 7th.

19

MR. McVEY:

It was sold on the 7th.

20

THE COURT:

It was sold on the 7th to Dennis

21
22

I

McLelland for $8,400.
MR. McVEY:

Correct.

So, your testimony was the

23

defendant - I apologize, your finding was the defendant said he

24

contacted Neeway on the 7th or 8th?

25

THE COURT:

The defendant testified he contacted him
488

on May 8 regarding the title.
MR. McVEY:

So your finding -

THE COURT:

Would be the 8th.

MR. McVEY:

And then could I ask the Court if its so

inclined to make a finding on Mr. Douglas' credibility?

I

mean, I know you - that's a request. If possible, could you
make a finding on that point, Your Honor?
THE COURT:
statement.

Well, let me just make this general

I didn't place much credibility on Mr. Gent's

testimony unless it was corroborated by other individuals;
however, he certainly has pled to at least one charge and
another one in abeyance so his...
MR. McVEY:

You mean Mr. Douglas, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

I'm talking about Mr. Gent.

MR. McVey:

Oh, Mr. Gent. All right. Right.

THE COURT:

He pled to one count, I believe,

and pled an abeyance to another so his reason for fabrication
at this point seems not to be extremely high, but based upon
his activities in this case, I do not find he had much
credibility and I tried to rely on corroboration as it related
to his testimony.
Mr. Douglas appeared credible to this Court although
I certainly took with some concern of his testimony based upon
the fact that he has been, at least entered a plea in abeyance
to an attempted communication fraud charge and he certainly was
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1

in the position where he was involved in this particular

2

activity. As it relates to Mr. Nichols and Mr. Douglas, I

3

certainly found many more occasions where Mr. Nichols'

4

testimony was contradicted by many, many other people and again

5

I commented on his credibility based upon the numerous factors

6

the Court (inaudible).

7

McVey, is I didn't take everything at face value. I weighed

8

it and gave him a certain degree of credibility but I wasn't

9

accepting everything I heard 100 percent. Clearly he didn't

10

want to be here today or for these proceedings.

11
12

I guess that's all I can say, Mr.

Anything else from either counsel?

We do need to

set -

13 J

THE DEFENDANT:

I'd like to say something.

14

THE COURT

Well, I'm sorry.

15

MR. McVEY

You'll get a chance later.

16 I

THE COURT

What we need to do is I'm going to refer

17

this matter to Adult Probation for Parole for the preparation

18

of a pre-sentence report and we'll set sentencing within 45

19

days.

20

What date do we have?

21 I

Mr. McVey, because of the nature and the complexity

22

of this case, they may want more than 45 days. I'm just

23 I thinking of AP&P's position. Do you have problem if we extend
24 i that time? Is your client willing to waive his right to be
25

sentenced within 45 days?
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